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THE SOUTH'S AMENDED BARRATRY LAWS: AN ATTEMPT
TO END GROUP PRESSURE THROUGH THE COURTS
IN the middle 1950's seven southern states suddenly discovered a need to
reinvigorate and extend existing champerty, maintenance and solicitation
rules.' The flurry of legislation came on the heels of the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Brozw v. Board of Education 2 in which five civil rights organizations
appeared as amicus curiae.3 The two events were not unconnected. The action
of the legislatures was a vigorous political response to the success of these
organizations before the courts.4 The validity of that response was seriously
questioned in NAACP v. Button,5 where the Supreme Court struck a Virginia
solicitation statute 6 which seemed drawn to impede the effectiveness of those
very groups of civil rights litigators who had been so effective in prior legal
assaults on segregation. That the states attempted to control their conduct was
not surprising, for the goals of these litigators are directly opposed to those of
the majoritarian forces in control of the states' political machinery.
Civil rights litigating organizations seek access to the courts primarily for
political ends-permanent change in law or social behavior rather than suc-
cessful prosecution of particular lawsuits over matters of substantial individual
1. See note 32 infra.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
3. The five were the American Jewish Congress, the American Civil Liberties Union,
the American Federation of Teachers, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the
American Veterans Committee. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 485-86
(1954). Also appearing as amicus curiae was the Assistant Attorney General of the
United States. Id. at 485. While neither the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People nor the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund appeared as
amicus curiae, they were the joint sponsors of the litigation. Letters from Robert L.
Carter, General Counsel of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, March 15, 1963, and Norman C. Amaker, NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, March 13, 1963, to the Yale Law Jounial, on file in Yale Law Library.
4. Although the legislation was cast in the familiar form of prohibitions of barratry,
maintenance, and solicitation, there can be no doubt that it was directed at civil rights organi-
zations (primarily the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund) and that it was intended to curtail
their legal assault on segregated education. Accounts of the legislative history of the Virginia
statutes are set forth in NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 511-15 (E.D. Va. 1958) ; Scull
v. Virginia ex rel. Comm. on Law Reform and Racial Activities, 359 U.S. 344, 346-47
(1959); James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331, 333-34 (E.D. Va. 1959); and Adkins v.
School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430, 434-42 (E.D. Va. 1957). While the statutes did not mention the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People or the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund by name, one assemblyman revealingly predicted "with this
set of bills... we can bust that organization ... wide open." Scull v. Virginia ex rel. Comm.
on Law Reform and Racial Activities, supra at 347 (citing testimony of James M. Thom-
son).
5. 371U.S.415 (1963).
6. VA. CODE A.N. §§ 54-74,54-78,54-79 (1958 Replacement).
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interest.7 Activities in pursuit of their goals vary from recommendation of ex-
pert legal assistance or filing of an occasional amicus brief to the active plan-
ning and control of a litigating curriculum.8 Control may take the form of
extension of legal aid to parties at interest, promotion and prosecution of class
suits, and other means of direct participation in sponsored litigation at trial as
well as appellate levels.9 For those organizations which participate most active-
ly at trial, legal activities may be but one facet of a broad educational-political
program which includes lobbying before legislatures, speechmaking, picketing
and general publicizing of civil rights issues. But achievement of their goals
through legislative means has too often proved hopeless: civil rights causes
often prove unpopular with dominant forces in the legislatures, whether from
their effect alone or because of the identity of those in whose behalf they are
advanced. And with legislative relief precluded, civil rights programs must be
prosecuted primarily in the courts.
Where the organization seeks to use its access to the courts for the attain-
ment of political ends, direct representation of litigants in sponsored litigation
7. The political character of group legal activities should not be overstresscd. Much of
the groups' work is entirely charitable-the provision of friendly legal advice to members of
the oppressed minorities they represent or minor participation in cases of interest to their
constituents.
The best known of the groups are probably the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, and The American Jewish Congress. Others include the Jehovah's
Witnesses, the Japanese American Citizens League, the American Jewish Committee, the
National Lawyers Guild, the Association on American Indian Affairs, the Protestants and
Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the American Council for
Nationalities Service, the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, the American Committee
for Protection of Foreign Born, the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, the
American Book Publishers Council, the Workers Defense League, and the American
Friends Service Committee.
8. Groups employ a variety of techniques to influence judicial decision. Amicus appear-
ances in cases affecting their interests, the promotion of law review comment favorable to
legal theories they wish to advance, and the use of political pressure to secure the appoint-
ment of sympathetic judges are among the many. For discussions of the use by groups of the
amicus device see Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 Annals 27-31
(1958) ; Bernstein, Volunteer Ainicus Curiae in Civil Rights Cases, 1 NYLS STUDENT L.
Rnv. 95 (1952) ; and Harper & Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L, Rav.
1172 (1953). On the promotion, by groups of law review comment see ScuunziiT, CoNsTITU-
TIONAL PoLiTics 70, 72-76, 80-81 (1960). A dramatic example of group use of political pres-
sure to influence judicial appointment is the NAACP's and the American Federation of
Labor's successful campaign to block congressional confirmation of Judge John 5. Parker's
appointment by President Hoover to the Supreme Court. See TRUMAN, THE GovE ENMNTAL
PROCESS 492 (1955) ; HUGHES, FIGHT FOR FREEDOm 74 (1962) ; and OviGToN, Tirt WALLS
CAmE TUMBLING DowN 251-56 (1947).
9. For comparative studies of certain of the groups, see Comment, Private Atiorneys-
General: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574 (1949) ; Vose,
Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 Annals 20 (1958) ; and Ginger,
Special Purpose Defense Organizations, 17 LAw. GuILD REv. 141 (1957). See also Robin-
son, Organizations Promoting Civil Rights aud Liberties, 275 Annals 18 (1951) and table II,
Appendix.
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usually is the most effective means of carrying out its program. It some cases,
litigation will not occur unless the organization itself in some manner acts to
institute litigation, since those harmed by objectionable practices may be un-
likely to bring an action, whether through fear or financial disability. And a
careful choice of cases for participation by the organization may be required to
maximize the use of its limited financial resources. Direct participation, as
opposed to participation through the amicus brief, has the advantage of allow-
ing the organization to shape the trial record in a way most favorable to the
broad issues it wishes to present.' 0
This fact of direct participation may, however, give rise to dangers of im-
propriety in litigation appearing to justify substantial state regulation of civil
rights litigators. Litigiousness, attorney-client conflicts of interest, and usurpa-
tion of political functions by the courts are among the evils which, in other con-
texts, states have freely regulated. Yet the valuable services performed by
these litigators in enforcing federal as well as state rights, and the strong likeli-
hood that legislative objections may arise from the effectiveness of their per-
formance rather than any such dangers may suggest the need for special judi-
cial consideration in evaluating state prerogatives to control civil rights litiga-
tors. This comment will seek to develop an approach to these problems by
focusing upon the fact situation recently confronted by the Supreme Court in
connection with the conflict between the NAACP and the Virginia legislature
over the rights of civil rights litigators to function in Virginia."
NAACP ACTION AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE IN VIRGINIA
Of all the civil rights litigating organizations, the NAACP and its offshoot,
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, are perhaps the most im-
portant and best organized.' 2 Formed in 1909 to fight racial discrimination in
10. See generally, Comment, Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in the Fight
for Civil Liberties, 58 YAiE L.J. 574, (1949).
11. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
12. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund was formed for tax purposes m
1939. (Unlike the Association, the Fund does not engage in propaganda and lobbying activi-
ties; therefore, contributions to it are not disqualified as charitable deductions by Iirr. REv.
CODE OF 1954 § 170 (c) (2) (d).) Until 1955, the Fund operated, in effect, as a subsidiary of
the Association. At that time, the Fund completely disassociated itself from the Association
in order to preserve its tax status. Letter from Robert L. Carter, General Counsel, NAACP,
to the Yale Law Journal, Apr. 15, 1963, on file in Yale Law Library.
Today, both the Association and the Fund have extensive legal programs. With an
income of $670,000 in 1962, the Fund employs nine attorneys, including its Director-Counsel,
and keeps two others on retainers. Interview by telephone with Jack Greenberg, Director-
Counsel of the Fund, March 5, 1963. In addition, large numbers of social scientists, eco-
nomists, and law professors have placed themselves at its disposal. NAACP v. Harrison,
202 Va. 142, 151, 116 S.E. 2d 55, 63 (1960). The Fund receives requests for assistance from
lawyers throughout the country. It determines whether or not to grant assistance by con-
sulting a variety of factors: overall strategic considerations, the nature and importance of
the issues involved, the status of the case, and the financial resources of the litigant. Where
assistance is granted, the litigant's attorney retains primary responsibility for the progress of
the case through the trial level, although Fund attorneys may approve pleadings and mo-
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the United States,13 the NAACP now has about 380,000 members, more than
1,000 affiliated branches, and an annual income in excess of $1,000,000.14 The
NAACP has been exceptionally effective in attaining its objectives before the
Supreme Court. In the over fifty victorious cases in which the NAACP has
participated directly, 5 it has succeeded in having declared unconstitutional the
enforcement by governmental units of such discriminatory practices as segre-
gated education (Brown v. Board of Education 10), racially restrictive cove-
nants (Shelley v. Kraemer 17), and the white primary (Smith v. Allwright 18).
More significant, perhaps, as an index of NAACP effectiveness in achieving
its goals has been the vigorous and concerted political action southern states
have taken to impede its further rending of their traditional social fabric.
Existing laws have been applied in a discriminatory manner, often to deprive
the NAACP of meeting halls, sometimes to impose exorbitant taxes upon its
operations or to require registration of its membership lists. Financial obstacles
have been imposed through enactment of prohibitive excises on dues and mem-
bership fees. Harassment by legislative investigative groups has resulted in
sequestration and publication of records and membership lists and slanderous
exposure of NAACP officials. Members of the Association have been denied
or removed from state jobs, either pursuant to specific legislation or, less open-
tions and take an active part in the preparation of briefs. Appeals are generally handled by
Fund attorneys alone. Typically, the litigant's attorney will receive about $750 for taking the
case through the trial level. Part of this is sometimes paid by the litigant or from the pro-
ceeds of a special fund drive. Interview with Jack Greenberg, Director-Counsel of the Fund,
in New York City, December 10, 1962.
The Association, since the formation of the Fund in 1939, has been primarily concerned
with litigation which affects itself as a corporate entity. Nevertheless, it continues in.
dependently to offer financial and legal assistance in cases involving segregation. At the
national level, it employs three attorneys and keeps two others on retainers. Letter from
Robert L. Carter, supra. The program's purpose and its current objectives were recently
outlined by the Association's general counsel:
Our main purpose is to break new legal ground, e.g., we are attempting to obtain a
definitive court ruling on the validity of so-called de facto school segregation; a ruling
by the National Labor Relations Board that it is both an unfair labor practice aid
grounds for revocatiorn of certification under the National Labor Relations Act for
a union to discriminate against Negroes in their status as union members or as em-
ployees.
Letter from Robert L. Carter, supra.
13. For histories of the NAACP see HUGHES, FIGHT FOR FREEDOM (1962) ; OvI oiTo,
THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DoW (1947) ; and JAcK, HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL Asso-
CIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (1943).
14. NAACP, REPORT FOR 1961, 18,79 (1961).
15. Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 ANNALS 22 (1958).
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The Association and the Fund were
co-sponsors of the litigation. Letters from Robert Carter, General Counsel, NAACP,
March 15, 1963; and Norman C. Amaker of the Fund, March 13, 1963, to the Yale Law
Journal on file in Yale Law Library.
17. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Association sponsored the related cases of McGhee v.
Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
18. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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ly, by administrative discrimination.'" The debilitating virulence of these state
attacks has forced the NAACP, in its own defense, to seek relief in those
courts where it usually attempts to vindicate the rights of others. And with
such cases before them, the courts, especially the Supreme Court, have been
able to confront the legislative attacks with a response based upon a constitu-
tionally found freedom of association.2 0 The regularity with which this judicial
response has taken the form of striking state measures inhibiting the organiza-
tional abilities of the NAACP has led to a continuing search for new devices,
more clearly within the realm of local power, to impede the effectiveness of
the Association.
One route to control of the judicial response has utilized the ability of the
state, through political means, to pressure the President into appointing judges
obviously resistant to the integration process.2 1 Insofar as it is limited to the
district court level, such an attack may, however, be restricted in effectiveness
to temporary postponement of the judicial response.2 2 Even if southern politi-
cians are able to secure appointment of judges at the district level whose
political interests are identical to those of dominant state legislative interests,
the task of controlling, through the appointive process, the responses at the
circuit court and Supreme Court level is far more difficult. In any case, the
infrequency of judicial appointments renders this an inherently long term ap-
proach to the problem. In the interests of a short term, more effective
"remedy," the states have continued a search for other techniques that might
preclude a suit challenging the social fabric from being instituted in the first in-
stance.
19. For discussions of these and other forms of attack directed at the NAACP see
A.mnacA_ JEwisH CoNGaxss, ASSAULT UPON Fm Dom OF Assowcusou-A STUDY OF
THE SOUTHERN ATTAcK ON THE NATIONAL ASsOcIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMINT OF COLOREnD
PEOPLE (1957); Robison, Protection of Associations from Compulsory Disclosure of
Membership, 58 COLUm. L. Rnv. 614 (1958); Murphy, The South Counteraotacks: The
Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. PoL Q. 371 (1959).
20. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), reversing Shelton v.
McKinley, 174 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Ark. 1959) ; and Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investiga-
tion Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
21. Several of President Kennedy's appointments in the Fifth Judicial Circuit seem
clearly within this category. See Bickel, Civil Rights, The New Republic, Vol. 147, No. 24,
Issue 2508, December 15, 1962, pp. 11, 16; and Bickel, Civil Rights Boil-Up, The New Re-
public, Vol. 148, No. 23, Issue 2533, June 8, 1963, pp. 10, 11-12. It might be argued that the
traditional veto power held by senators over judicial appointments in their districts rather
than direct pressure upon the President has resulted in these appointments. But, even granted
that tradition is unbreakable in this area, the President retains the power to make no ap-
pointment and to allow the Chief Justice to assign a judge from another district to fill any
vacancy. Id. at 12.
22. The device remains extremely effective, however. As Professor Bickel noted:
This is a matter of first importance, now and in the future, for district judges have
life tenure, of course, they ordinarily sit alone, and they have much discretionary
power which is not easily subject to review by the Court of Appeals, nor the Supreme
Court.
Bickel, Civil Rights, note 21 supra at 16.
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The framework for such an attack lay in existing state legislation regulating
the conduct of the legal profession. Prior to 1956, Virginia's regulations, typi-
cal of those in most states, controlled solicitation of business for an attorney.
It rendered his agent subject to prosecution for a misdemeanor ;23 the at-
torney who advertised or solicited business directly or indirectly was subject
to disbarment.24 In addition to this statutory identification of unprofessional
conduct, the practice of law was controlled by the Canons of Legal Ethics
formulated by the American Bar Association, and adopted by the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.25 Thus, though barratry-"stirring up strife and
litigation"--was not specifically prohibited by statute, it was a cause for dis-
barment under Canon 28.26 Maintenance, wrongfully intermeddling in a suit
through financial or other types of assistance, was also regulated only through
application of the canons. Under Canon 42, attorneys were prohibited from pay-
ing the out-of-pocket expenses of their clients' lawsuits 27 In addition to the regu-
lations directed at lawyers, pre-1956 Virginia statutes also attempted to govern
the participation of organizations in the practice of law. Rendering legal
services by non-lawyers and corporations employing lawyers for that purpose
was made illegal ;28 moreover, control of an attorney by a lay intermediary was
a sufficient basis for the lawyer's discipline under Canon 35.20 And under
Canon 47 disciplinary action could be taken if the attorney aided or abetted an
23. Va. Acts 1932, ch. 284, at 512-13 (now VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-78, 54-79 [1958 Re-
placement] ).
24. Va. Acts 1932, ch. 129, at 138 (now VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74 [1958 Replacement]).
25. 171 Va. xviii-xxxv (1938). The first code of legal ethics was adopted by the Ala-
bama State Bar Association in 1887. DRINKER, LECAL ETHIcs 23 (1953). This was followed
in 1908 by the adoption of the Canons of Professional Ethics by the American Bar Asso-
ciation. Id. at 24. Since 1908, most state bar associations have adopted the American Bar
Association code. National amendments are either carried over automatically or specially
inserted in the state codes; thus, the provisions of the Canons are fairly uniform nationwide,
Id. at 25. As a general rule, the Canons do not have the force of law. They are commonly
used by the courts, however, in disciplining attorneys, as standards for determining proper
professional conduct. Id. at 26-30. But the Virginia Canons of Professional Ethics were
adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48
(1958 Replacement) and thus have the force and effect of law.
26. Canon 28 provides in part:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so .... It is
disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof
in order to be employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds
of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like
purposes....
171 Va. xxix-xxx (1938).
27. 171 Va. xxxiv (1938).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-44 (1958 Replacement) ; Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc.
v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937).
29. Canon 35 provides in part:
Internsediaries.-The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or
exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client
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organization engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.30 But champerty,
barratry, and maintenance were traditionally conceived as directed at com-
mercial evils and, hence, not applied to gratuitous offering of legal services.3 '
There had never been a successful attempt, prior to 1956, to apply them to
organizations such as the NAACP or the Legal Defense Fund or to find those
charitable organizations engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Because of these difficulties, it was widely felt in the South that the exist-
ing legislation would not serve effectively as an attack on NAACP ability to
litigate. Virginia became the second of seven southern states to enact legisla-
tion broadening former definitions of barratry, maintenance, and solicitation to
include the activities of the NAACP, the Fund, and their attorneys.-m In its
1956 Extra Session, the Virginia Assembly enacted Chapter 35 of the Virginia
laws, defining barratry to include any arrangement where persons having no
direct or pecuniary interest contribute toward the expenses of a lawsuit,
whether or not such a contribution resulted in "stirring up" undesirable litiga-
tion.33 Chapter 36, expanding the meaning of maintenance, made it unlawful
to give or receive money, goods, or services as an inducement to the institution
of a suit against the government, or advocate such a suit, regardless of mo-
tive.34 The language of these broadened definitions was qualified only by ex-
empting contingent fee contracts, certain kinds of zoning and title-quieting pro-
and lawyer.... A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the responsi-
bility should be direct to the client...
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association,
club or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in which the organi-
zation, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should not include the render-
ing of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect to their in-
dividual affairs.
171 Va. xx.xi-iii (1938).
30. Canon 47 provides:
Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law.-No lawyer shall permit his professional
services, or his name, to be used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized prac-
tice of law by any lay agency, personal or corporate.
171 Va. xxxv (1938). All states have provisions restricting entry into the legal profession
and barring unlicensed persons from the practice of law. Under these provisions it is
generally agreed that corporations may not practice law. (Recently a number of states have
passed statutes enabling law firms to "incorporate" for federal tax purposes. Firms in-
corporated under these statutes, however, possess few of the normal incidents of a corporate
form. See Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation, 17 TAX L REV.
1 (1961) and 5 CouxmRymA", THE LAWYER IN MODERN SocIETY 258-82 (1962).)
31. See note 75 infra.
32. The legislation in the other sLx states is similar to Virginia's. See Anm STAT. AzNN.
§§ 41-703 to -713 (Supp. 1961) (added in 1958); FL. STAT. ANN. §§ 877.01 to 877.02
(Supp. 1962) (added in 1959) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4701 to -4703 (Supp. 1961) (added in
1960 to replace similar legislation enacted in 1957) ; MIss. CODE AN. §§ 2049-01 to -0S
(1956) (added in 1956) ; S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-521 to -525 (1962) (added in 1956) ; and
TENN. CODE ANT. §§ 39-3405 to -3410 (Supp. 1962) (amended in 1957).
33. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 18.1-388 to -393 (1960 Replacement).
34. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-394 to -400 (1960 Replacement).
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ceedings, and payments to attorneys by approved legal aid societies. 0 Chapter
33 seemed to expand the definition of "running and capping" and "unpro-
fessional conduct" to include conduct largely resembling the regular behavior
of the NAACP.3 6 Running and capping now explicitly included the procure-
ment of legal business for a corporation which compensates attorneys serving
in judicial proceedings where the corporation has no direct interest, regardless
of the charitable character of the corporation or the fact that litigants do not
contribute to the costs of litigation.37 And unprofessional conduct was broad-
35. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1 - 388(f), 18.1 - 399 (1960 Replacement).
36. Chapter 33 amended and reenacted VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 (1958
Replacement). Section 54-74 provides in part:
(1) Issuance of rulc.-If ... any court of record of this State, observes, or if
complaint, verified by affidavit, be made by any person to such court of any mal-
practice or of any unlawful or dishonest or unworthy or corrupt or unprofessional
conduct on the part of any attorney... such court shall, if it deems the case a proper
one for such action, issue a rule against such attorney ... to show cause why his
license to practice shall not be revoked or suspended.
(4) Action of court.-Upon the hearing, if the defendant be found guilty by the
court, his license to practice law ... shall be revoked, or suspended for such time as
the court may prescribe; provided, that the court, in lieu of revocation or suspension,
may, in its discretion, reprimand such attorney.
(6) "Any malpractice, or any unlawful or dishonest or unworthy or corrupt or
unprofessional conduct", as used in this section, shall be construed to include the im-
proper solicitation of any legal or professional business or employment, either directly
or indirectly, or the acceptance of employment, retainer, compensation or costs from
any person, partnership, corporation, organization or association with knowledge that
Stch person, partnership, corporation, organization or association has violated any
provision of article 7 of this chapter [§§ 54-78 to -83.1] .... [Italics added to show
amended parts].
Section 54-78 provides in part:
(1) A "runner" or "capper" is any person, corporation, partnership or associa-
tion acting in any manner or in any capacity as an agent for an attorney at law within
this State or for any person, partnership, corporation, organization or association
which employs, retains or compensates any attorney at law in connection with any
judicial proceeding in which such person, partnership, corporation, organization or
association is not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability, in the
solicitation or procurement of business for such attorney at law or for such person,
partnership, corporation, organization or association in connection with any judicial
proceedings for which such attorney or such person, partnership, corporation, organi-
zation or association is employed, retained or compensated.
(2) An "agent" is one who represents another in dealings with a third person
or persons. [Italics added to show amended parts].
Section 54-79 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, partnership or association to
act as a runner or capper as defined in § 54-78 to solicit any business for an attorney
at law or such person, partnership, corporation, organization or association ....
[Italics added to show amended parts].
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-78 (1958 Replacement).
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ened to include an attorney's acceptance of compensation from anyone guilty of
running and capping.38
The crippling effect this legislation would have had on the NAACP if en-
forced was clear from the outset, given the structure of the Association's ac-
tivities at the state level. 39 In Virginia, the NAACP's 89 local branches were
organized into the Virginia Conference.40 Both the branches and the Confer-
ence, through public meetings, encourage Negroes to assert their rights against
the state; this action was certain to fall within the amended definition of mainte-
nance.41 Moreover, the added inducement of Association willingness to provide
38. VA. CODE Axn. § 54-74 (6) (1958 Replacement). Supplementing Chapters 33, 35,
and 36 were Chapter 31, VA. CODE AN. §§ 18.1-372 to -379 (1960), requiring persons or
organizations soliciting or expending money in connection with litigation to register the
names and addresses of members, officers, employees, and contributors, as well as detailed
financial statements and a certified copy of the organization's charter; Chapter 32, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.1-380 to -387 (1960), requiring that the same information demanded in Chapter
31, supra, be given by any person or organization active in
promoting or opposing in any manner the passage of legislation by the General As-
sembly in behalf of any race or color, or who or which has as one of its principal func-
tions or activities the advocating of racial integration or segregation or whose activi-
ties cause or tend to cause racial conflicts or violence, or who or which is engaged or
engages in raising or expending funds for the employment of counsel or payment of
costs in connection with litigation in behalf of any race or color, in this State [,]
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-381 (1960) ; and Chapters 34 and 37, Va. Acts 1956 x. Sess., chs.
34, 37, setting up legislative committees to oversee the enforcement of the various provisions
and to investigate and hold hearings to determine whether any additional legislation was
needed.
39. The promotion of litigation eventually sponsored by the Association or the Fund is
carried on at the local level by NAACP branches, other Negro rights organizations, and
the Negro bar. In Virginia the NAACP has a membership of approximately 13,500.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419 (1963). The Virginia Conference of NAACP
Branches maintains a legal staff of fifteen members and sponsors litigation independently of
both the national office and the Fund; for this purpose it spent more than 25,000 in a two-
year period between 1956 and 1958. Ibid.; Record No. 5096, pp. 281-86, NAACP v. Harrison,
202 Va. 142, 116 S.E. 2d 55 (1960). Although members of the legal staff generally maintain
private practices, a large part of their time is spent in Conference activities, for which they
receive expense reimbursement and per diem compensation when involved in sponsored liti-
gation. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 149, 116 S.E. 2d 55, 62 (1960). In their respective
communities, members keep alert for and prosecute Conference-sponsored suits. Occasional-
ly they address groups of Negroes to inform them of or to encourage them to assert their
constitutional rights. Collectively they exchange ideas and map out strategies relative to
suits sponsored by the Conference and involving common issues.
Suits arise in a number of different ways. See NAACP v. Button, supra at 421-22; and
NAACP v. Harrison, supra at 147-51, 116 S.E. 2d at 60-63. Certain kinds of suits begin with
a request by an individual for NAACP assistance. Litigants either go directly or are referred
by a branch official to a member of the Conference legal staff. If the chairman of the staff and
the president of the Conference concur, the Conference will agree to defray some of the ex-
penses of litigation. Often, additional assistance is sought from the Fund. In school litigation,
which since 1954 has constituted the major part of the Conference's legal work, the procedure
is more complex. See note 43 infra.
40. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419 (1963).
41. VA. CODE Axx. § 18.1-394 (1960 Replacement).
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legal assistance, would constitute both maintenance and barratry.42 Often, at
the instance of the local NAACP branch, a church or other social group, Con-
ference officials or members of the legal staff addressed school parents, ex-
plained the legal procedures for challenging segregated schools, and urged
them to act. At some of these meetings prepared forms were distributed au-
thorizing staff lawyers to institute suit on behalf of the person signing.43 These
authorizations, and the common practice of directing inquiries to the Con-
ference for legal action when prospective litigants approach branch members
directly, would seem to satisfy the requirements of solicitation under the 1956
laws."
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE: POLICE POWER V. FREE SPEECH
In 1957 the NAACP and the Fund instituted declaratory judgment pro-
ceedings in a three-judge federal district court, seeking to have the entire sta-
tutory establishment declared unconstitutional insofar as it might apply to
them. After a complicated course of litigation, they succeeded in obtaining from
the Virginia courts a declaration that all of the acts except Chapter 33 [solici-
tation] were unconstitutional, on the ground that they interfered with freedom
of association, with the first amendment right to advocate pursuit of legal
rights through litigation, and with a due process right of access to courts which
includes the rights to finance and receive assistance for litigation.4" But while
affirming the right of the NAACP and the Fund to advocate and finance litiga-
42. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-388, 18.1-394 (1960 Replacement).
43. Often, as many as 150 persons are joined as plaintiffs in a school suit. See NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 422 n. 6 (1963). Once a suit is instituted, the staff lawyer in charge
often brings in other members of the staff. In addition, especially at appellate levels, Fund
assistance may be sought.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-78 (1958 Replacement).
45. The NAACP and the Fund first sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction
enjoining the enforcement of Chapters 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36 (see notes 33-38 supra and ac-
companying text) in the federal district court. The three judge court in NAACP v. Patty,
159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), held Chapters 31, 32 and 35 unconstitutional but with-
held judgment on Chapters 33 and 36 pending a state court construction. This holding was
reversed by the Supreme Court in Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), on the ground
that a prior state construction of all the chapters was necessary. After the decision in Patty,
resort was had to the state court with respect to Chapters 33 and 36, the NAACP asking
for a construction and an injunction against enforcement and the Fund asking for a construc-
tion only. The suits were consolidated and the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E2d 55 (1960), construed both chapters to prohibit
certain activities of both the NAACP and the Fund. The court proceeded to declare Chapter
36 but not Chapter 33 unconstitutional. At this point the N.A.A.C.P. and the Fund parted
company, the NAACP seeking certiorari with respect to that part of the opinion upholding
the constitutionality of Chapter 33 and the Fund returning to the district court with its con-
struction. The NAACP's suit culminated in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In
the meanwhile, after the decision in Harrison v. NAACP, mnpra, the NAACP and the
Fund initiated state proceedings with respect to Chapters 31, 32, and 35. Before the Circuit
Court of the City of Richmond the state conceded the unconstitutionality of Chapter 35 under
NAACP v. Harrison, supra. The court proceeded to hold unconstitutional not only Chapter
35, but also Chapter 31 and the principal provisions of Chapter 32. NAACP Legal Defense
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tion, the Virginia court condemned their practices of soliciting litigation for
and making payments to their own attorneys or other particular attorneys,
finding such practices both legally prohibited and constitutionally prohibitable
by Chapter 33.4 The court rejected an argument, made improbable by the
recent legislative expansion of the definition, that NAACP activities did not
come within the meaning of solicitation. In fact, it suggested that these activi-
ties were so far within the traditional doctrines of solicitation as also to violate
pre-1956 strictures against unauthorized practice and the intervention of lay
intermediaries. As the court characterized the Association's activities, they
included not only vigorous advocacy and generous financing of litigation care-
fully channeled to particular lawyers, but also substantial elements of control
over the day-to-day management of litigation. 47 It seems, however, that the
court made these findings of control not to satisfy a construction of statutory
language but to demonstrate a fortiori that the organizations fell within lan-
guage "dear and definite in... [its] meaning."48 What the court felt to be the
boundaries of "solicitation" were left undefined beyond common understand-
ing, except, perhaps, to the extent that in a subsequent part of the opinion the
court suggested limitations by its exclusion of unchannelled financing and ad-
vocacy, activity which it said fell within the protection of the first and four-
teenth amendments.
49
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. r ° The majority
found the Virginia court's attempted distinction between non-directed advocacy
and "channeling" insufficient to counterbalance readily predictable infringements
on admitted speech activity; it held the statute as construed to be an uncon-
stitutional impairment of freedom of speech. Referring to the need to regulate
the areas bordering speech with "narrow specificity,"'r it read the decree of
the Virginia court to proscribe "any arrangement by which prospective liti-
gants are advised to seek the assistance of particular attorneys." 2 The fact
that a criminal violation might arise from "simple referral"' r was said to give
and Educational Fund, Inc. v. Harrison, Ch. No. B-2879, Cir. Ct City of Richmond, Va.,
Aug. 31, 1962; NAACP v. Harrison, CI. No. B-2880, Cir. Ct. City of Richmond, Va., Aug.
31, 1962.
46. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 164-65, 116 S.E. 2d 55, 72 (1960).
47. Id. at 150, 155, 116 S.E.2d at 62, 65-66. In finding that the NAACP controlled
sponsored litigation, the court relied heavily on the Association's policy, adopted in 1950, of
not financing school suits seeking separate but equal facilities. Id. at 149, 116 S.E. 2d at 62.
The court viewed evidence that certain plaintiffs in NAACP sponsored suits had had no
contact with their attorneys and in some cases had been unaware that suits had been in-
stituted in their names as further proof of control by the Association. Id. at 150-51, 155, 116
S.E. 2d at 63, 65-66. It concluded that both litigants and attorneys "must adhere to a policy
of permitting the NAACP, the Conference and the Fund to direct and control the litigation."
Id. at 155,116 S.E. 2d at 65.
48. Id. at 154, 116 S.E. 2d at 65.
49. Id. at 163-65, 116 S.E. 2d at 71-72.
50. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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rise to "the gravest danger of smothering all discussion looking to the eventual
institution of litigation on behalf of the rights of members of an unpopular
minority."5 4 The breadth and vagueness of the statute, enabling excessive
prosecutorial discretion, might lead to such inhibition of the concededly pro-
tected forms of expression as to prohibit them. This was especially true for the
NAACP, since it was doubtful that it could effectively utilize the protected
rights to advocate and finance litigation in the context of a largely hostile
southern bar without appearing to channel to particular attorneys.55 Thus, the
Court, though admitting that channeling of litigants to particular attorneys was
non-speech in first amendment terms,56 found the Association's acts so in-
timately connected with protected action as to deprive first amendment free-
doms of needed "breathing space."
'57
If the Court had merely struck the statute on these grounds of vagueness,
its action might have been no more than an invitation for more careful drafts-
54. Id. at 434.
55. The dissenters did not question the majority's prediction that a statute prohibiting
"simple referral" might effectively prohibit or discourage advocacy and financing. Instead,
they challenged the majority's finding that Chapter 33 was such a statute. To them, it seemed
clear that Chapter 33 required not only referral but also payment and control of the lawyer
to whom a litigant is referred. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 466-68 (1963) (dissenting
opinion). Alternatively, they argued that Chapter 33 was separable-that the Court mlght
have struck the statute insofar as it applied to bar "simple referral" and yet have left intact
its application to activities such as those of the NAACP which the Virginia court had
found to include both control and referral. Id. at 468-69.
56. This is not to say that the Court held "channeling" (referring litigants to particular
attorneys) wholly without tie area of constitutional protection. Other parts of its opinion
would indicate the contrary. See note 61 infra and accompanying text. For purposes of its
void-for-vagueness discussion, however, the constitutional status of "channeling" was ir-
relevant. The basis of the Court's argument was that even if a state might prohibit "channel-
ing," it could not do so in such a manner as also to prohibit or discourage advocacy and
financing-activity which was admittedly protected,
57. The Court's holding that Chapter 33 was "void-for-vagueness" seems to have beenl
grounded upon the difficulty, given advocacy and financing, of disproving referral. Because
of this difficulty, the Court feared that a prohibition of "simple referral" would deter persons
from advocating and financing litigation and thus giving the appearance of having referred.
By basing its decision on such considerations, the Court may have extended the former
contours of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. For Button is neither of the class of cases
typified by Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), "in which a legislature which
might constitutionally have proscribed either or both of two classes of behavior, A and B,
has chosen to proscribe only A, but in language so uncertain that whether most fact situa-
tions are A or B is a matter for guesswork," Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine it the
Stpreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rsv. 67, 76 (1960), nor of the class typified by Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), "in which a legislature, constitutionally free to regulate
sphere A, but forbidden to encroach upon sphere B, has included indiscriminately within
the broad wording of a criminal statute both A cases and B cases, thereby leaving the
individual to guess at his peril whether he can or cannot be constitutionally punished for
violation of the statute," ibid. While Button is kindred to the latter class of cases, it is
different in that Chapter 33 did not in terms prohibit "sphere B" conduct. Nor was there
any ambiguity in this respect. Only referral was prohibited; the right to engage in "sphere
B" conduct-advocacy and financing-was specifically affirmed.
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manship by the Virginia legislature, since its opinion would have posed no bar
to regulations requiring further elements of control. In fact, the form for such
redefinition was readily available in those Canons of Legal Ethics respecting
unauthorized practice which the Virginia court had asserted to be applicable
to the activities in question.58 Such new prohibitions, based on the "lay in-
termediary" character of the Association's activities, would compel disbanding
the Virginia legal staff. As a result, the planning and tactical advantages to be
gained through coordination of select groups of expert, interested lawyers
would be unavailable. And since professional careers would hang upon ad-
judication of alleged violations before expectably biased juries, a control test
would probably increase NAACP dissociation from litigation to a degree be-
yond that appearing from its terms. 9 To avoid this result, the majority opinion
58. The Virginia court held that lawyers for the NAACP and the NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund were violating Canons 35 and 47 of the Virginia Canons uf
Professional Ethics. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 156, 164, 116 S.E.2d 55,67,72 (1960).
Canon 35 on lay intermediaries and Canon 47 on the unauthorized practice of law are bath
directed at elements of control in organizational activity. See notes 29-30 supra. By finding
Association and Fund lawyers in violation of Canon 47, the court impliedly found both or-
ganizations to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Thus, if the Supreme Court
had limited itself to a holding that any statute barring "simple referral" is void-for-vague-
ness, Canons 35 and 47 and the Virginia unauthorized practice statute (see note 28 .rpra)
would have remained in force to prohibit the organization's activities.
59. Justice Harlan read Chapter 33 as prohibiting referral to lawyers controlled by
the Association. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 466-68 (dissenting opinion). So con-
strued he did not believe the statute would substantially impair the Association's effective-
ness. Id. at 465 (dissenting opinion). The correctness of this prediction would depend in part
upon the content later given the concept of "control." If employment or membership on a
legal staff such as that of the Virginia Conference (see note 39 .rupra) were adopted as the
sine qua non of control, the Association and the Defense Fund would have been greatly in-
convenienced but not disabled. The Conference would have had to disband its staff and the
Defense Fund would have had to fire its attorneys and break up its office. Many strategic
and tactical advantages would thus have been sacrificed, but both would have been able to
continue advocating and financing litigation.
The decree of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, shows that it would
have given "control" a much wider content. There are indications, for example, that the
court would have required that attorneys be paid by the litigants themselves and that any
assistance given litigants be in the form of cash without strings as to the manner of prosecut-
ing or the attorney to prosecute the suit. It seems certain, moreover, that the court would
not have been satisfied with a mere disbanding of the legal staff. Any former association or
present working relationship with the Conference or the Defense Fund would have been con-
sidered strong evidence of control. Thus, for example, attorneys to whom litigants were
regularly referred might have been deemed "controlled" by the Conference, regardless of the
fact that they were compensated by the litigants directly, because of the attorneys' possible
reliance on this source of business. (Under the interpretation of the Virginia decree adopted
by the majority, of course, such referral would have been unlawful per se.)
Had such a content been given the concept of control, large numbers of difficult factual
questions would have been made available for manipulation by possibily biased juries. (E.g.,
Did the litigant receive the money without strings or was there a stipulation that the suit
be for integrated and not merely separate but equal facilities? In determining whether to
grant assistance, does the Conference or the Defense Fund consider the personality of the
lawyer selected by the litigant?) Since the right to practice law of every lawyer handling
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went beyond the issue of the constitutionality of the statute as construed, to
an exploration of the constitutionality of the application to the NAACP or,
impliedly, other civil rights litigators, of the usual forms of regulation of legal
practice, despite the normal practice of limiting constitutional decision to mat-
ters necessarily before the Court.
To sweep such hypothetical regulations within its disapprobation, the ma-
jority opinion of Justice Brennan employed expanded concepts of speech and
association and unusually restrictive attitudes toward state regulatory powers.
While the infirmities of Chapter 33 as construed are discussed in terms of
"real" speech-acquainting persons with their legal rights, advising them to
institute litigation, etc.-where the Court turns to a discussion of NAACP
activities it ignores lines of distinction between the rights of free speech, as-
sembly, and petition.60 In place of such distinctions, the Court demonstrates a
functional concern with the need for free political expression as the basis for
the unimpeded operation of the democratic process.0 1 NAACP activities, which
the Court found presented only a "superficial resemblance in form"0 2 to tradi-
tionally defined improper practices, were thus found to be within the meaning
of the first amendment regardless of whether they constituted "solicitation."
Consequently, the generalized danger which usually serves to justify state
sponsored litigation would have hinged upon the resolution of such questions (which resolu-
tion, incidentally, could not effectively have been reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court),
there would seem to be much truth in the prediction of disaster made by the Association's
General Counsel:
[F]ar more devastating than any specific limitation on our activity, which would
have resulted from the state decision being upheld, would have been the climate
created in Virginia and throughout the South. Lawyers, particularly those accustomed
to working in this area, would have had to be gravely concerned about their profes-
sional careers. I doubt if we could have secured local lawyers to carry on civil rights
litigation. Indeed, in my judgment, affirmation of the state decision would have been
as effective a destruction of the NAACP as anything which could have been devised.
Letter from Robert L. Carter, General Counsel of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People, to the Yale Law Journal, April 15, 1963, on file in Yale Law
Library.
60. Compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-31 (1963), with id. at 431-34,
61. The Court held that the activities of the Association revealed by the record were,
in toto, "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 428-29. Thus, first amendment protection was not limited to such
speech activity as acquainting persons with their legal rights and urging them to institute
suits; it was extended to include all incidents to political litigation activities by associa-
tions. In thus augmenting the growing block of associational rights, the Court recognized the
political character and importance of group litigation.
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment
by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community
in this country. It is thus a form of political expression.... [U]nder the conditions of
modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a
minority to petition for redress of grievances.
Id. at 429-30. Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
62. 371 U.S. at 442.
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regulatory measures, even where they extend for reasons of administrative
convenience into areas where the danger may fairly be said not to exist, would
be insufficient to justify statutory regulation of civil rights litigators. Only
where specific and compelling dangers rise from the practices themselves may
the NAACP's litigating practices be regulated, in view of the added compulsion
of first amendment considerations to non-regulation.6 Although couched in
specific terms of NAACP litigating activities, these portions of the opinion
were clearly marked by the Court as applicable to similar regulation of any
of the civil rights litigating groups.6 4
Four members of the Court dissented from this expansive approach to asso-
ciational rights. Although Mr. Justice Harlan, with Justices Clark and Stewart
concurring, dissented also from the "void for vagueness" finding of the Court,
it was the associational problem to which he gave his most serious attention.es
Mr. Justice White, who concurred in the Court's application of first amend-
ment principles to the statute as construed, reacted strongly to what he termed
the decision of "a case not before the Court,""0 and indicated that he would
have been more willing to sustain regulation which required proof of actual
control of the day-to-day course of litigation by the NAACP.0 7 Mr. Justice
Harlan agreed that litigation such as the NAACP engaged in was a form of
expression within the first amendment ;68 but, relying principally on the pos-
sible dangers of conflicts of interest between the NAACP and sponsored
litigants, "precipitate resort to litigation,"6 9 and "unnecessarily broad attacks
based upon inadequate records," 70 he argued that on balance Virginia's regula-
tion was reasonable and fully supported by the state's "interest... [in] main-
taining high professional standards among those who practice law within its
borders." 71
63. The Court clearly implied that it would require a showing of something on the order
of "neglect or harassment of clients" or "injurious intervention in or control of litigation"
before it would consider regulation of the NAACP's litigating activities justified. Id. at 433,
444.
64. Id. at 444.
65. Id. at 448-470 (dissenting opinion).
66. Id. at 448 (concurring opinion of Justice White).
67. Id. at 447-48 (concurring opinion of Justice White). In thus refusing to extend a
blanket approval to the NAACP's activities, Justice White took the middle position between
Justices Brennan and Harlan. Distinguishing "actual control" from "control" as defined by
the Virginia court, he found only the latter protected. Although "actual control" is nowhere
precisely defined, it clearly means something more than "advising Negroes of their consti-
tutional rights, urging them to institute litigation of a particular kind, recommending particu-
lar lawyers and financing such litigation" (id. at 447) and something less than the "injurious
intervention in or control of litigation" (id. at 444) required by the majority. Justice White
carefully avoided deciding whether the existence of an employment or official relationship be-
tween attorneys and the sponsoring organization would constitute "actual control."
68. Id. at 452-53 (dissenting opinion).
69. Id. at 464 (dissenting opinion).
70. Ibid.
•71. Id. at 455 (dissenting opinion). Neither the majority opinion of Justice Brennan,
the concurring opinion of Justice White, nor the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan devoted
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Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent draws its strongest support from state interests
in regulating the practice of law-interests which surpass the usual regulatory
interest in protecting unknowing consumers of goods and services from hard-
to-identify incompetents and frauds. Here, the state must also protect both a
relationship requiring an atmosphere of utmost trust, and the operation of its
courts, an essential part of its functional governing machinery. As Mr. Justice
Harlan noted in Cohen v. Hurley:
It is no less true than trite that lawyers must operate in a three-fold
capacity, as -self-employed businessmen as it were, as trusted agents of their
clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solution to dis-
putes. It is certainly not beyond the realm of permissible state concerns
to conclude that too much attention to the business of getting clients may
be incompatible with a sufficient devotion to duties which a lawyer owes
to the court, or that the "payment of awards to persons bringing in legal
business" is inconsistent with the personally disinterested position a law-
yer should maintain.
72
The Supreme Court, moreover, has generally been tolerant in dealing with
both the legislative choice and the application of regulations conceded to be
within these interests, even where the application is to situations arguably not
within their rationale.73 This tolerance has frequently been justified by the
need to recognize state choice of administratively convenient means to reach
legitimate ends and the desire to abstain from deciding cases on the basis of
the wisdom or purpose of state legislation where the usual application appears
justified.74 If organizational litigators present substantial dangers (either of
any attention to the politically responsive aspects of the statute's passage. The vagueness of
the Virginia statute aside, it seems that all the opinions except Justice Douglas' short con-
currence (371 U.S. at 445-46) viewed the problem of striking state regulatory statutes
governing politically expressive litigation as a first amendment balancing problem. As-
serting that the Virginia legislation reflected "a legislative purpose to penalize the
NAACP because it promotes desegregation of the races" (371 U.S. at 445) and "was part
of the program of 'massive resistance' against Brown v. Board of Education, [347 U.S. 483
(1954) ]" (371 U.S. at 446), however, Justice Douglas argued that the legislation was also
objectionable on equal protection grounds. While this approach might be criticized as in-
volving judicial inquiry into legislative "motive" [see, e.g., Howell, Legislative Molive and
Legislative Purpose in the Invalidation of a Civil Rights Statute, 47 VA. L. REv. 439 (1961),
criticizing use of this approach by Judge Soper in the related case of NAACP v. Patty, 159
F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958) ], it draws strong support from such cases as Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958), where the Court has made clear that it will not tolerate "evasive schemes
for segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously'" (id. at 17).
72. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117,124 (1961).
73. In Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961), for example, the Court dismissed "for
want of a substantial federal question" an appeal challenging the constitutionality on equal
protection grounds of Kansas court rules barring attorneys regularly practicing in other
states from appearing in Kansas courts without associating local counsel, as applied to a
member of the Kansas and Missouri bars who regularly practiced in both states, despite the
dissent's apparently correct assertion that the declared regulatory interests had no bearing
upon the particular result achieved. Such attorneys would be conveniently available for the
service of Kansas process and would have the requisite knowledge of local procedure.
74. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32 (1963) ; Williamson v. Lee
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the kind against which traditional prohibitions of solicitation and unauthorized
practice are directed or of a kind which might justify an extension of such
prohibitions)-and Justice Harlan's argument that they do is persuasive-or
if the activities of these litigators are so like others which do present dangers
that it would be difficult if not impossible effectively to prohibit one without
prohibiting the other, those parts of the majority opinion which go beyond a
finding that Chapter 33 was void for vagueness may be seriously questioned.
In asserting that traditional doctrines of solicitation and unauthorized prac-
tice have no application to the activities of organizational litigators, the major-
ity was on safe ground.7 5 It is in commercial contexts that the evils with which
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955) ; Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference &
Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236,246-47 (1941).
75. That these doctrines have no relevance to such activities appears primarily from the
history of their development and the nature of the evils at which they are directed. Rules
against solicitation developed in the genteel atmosphere of the early English bar, to protect
its fraternal intimacy from destruction by competitive strife. DRINxER, LEAL E~rmcs
210 (1953). While solicitation rules rest on a broader basis today, the continuing desire to
prevent commercialization of the profession is primarily responsible for their present vitality.
In addition, it is feared that solicitation would promote unnecessary and possibly fraudulent
litigation and would encourage attorneys to make extravagant and misleading claims as to
their ability and the strength of their clients' cases. See generally Note, A Critical Analysis
of Riles Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHL L. REv. 674 (1958).
In view of these purposes, solicitation rules have been held inapplicable to offers of
gratuitous assistance not made in a commercial context. See In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467,
480-81 (D.C. Md. 1934) (lawyer for International Labor Defense volunteered to assist
Negro charged with murder of white family); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 366,
373, 12 S.E2d 602, 610 (1940) (local bar association offered lenders free legal assistance in
campaign to suppress usurious loan companies); AUzaMCAN BAR AssocATIon, sunpra,
Opinion 148 (1935), at 308 (committee of American Liberty League which believed the
Wagner Act to be unconstitutional offered to defend without charge any person affected
thereby.) But see COazszrr.E ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF TME NEW YORK COUNTY
LAWYERS' ASsOciATIoN, QuzsTIoNs, Question 256, at 234 (1927). Where an offer of gratu-
itous assistance is made with the hope of securing future business or in a context giving rise
to a suspicion of such motive, it is considered unethical. AaMEIcAw BAR AssOCIATIoZ, 4spra,
Opinion 169 (1937), at 342.
Prior to the Button litigation, no court had had occasion to consider the applicability
of the rules to activities such as those of the NAACP and the Defense Fund. Since lawyers
for these organizations do receive compensation and since, in some cases, litigants do contri-
bute toward expenses, the gratuitous offer, non-commercial context cases are not squarely
in point. Nevertheless, considering the commercial target of the rules, the logic of the cases
apjlies with equal force. Sums paid by assisted litigants never amount to more than a small
fraction of total costs. Interview with Jack Greenberg, Director-Counsel of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, in New York City, December 10, 1962. Thus, neither
the organizations nor their attorneys appear motivated by a desire to reap financial benefits
See note 80 infra.
The irrelevance of unauthorized practice rules is less obvious but is clear nevertheless.
The purpose of these rules, as applied to bar lay organizations from hiring attorneys to
practice law for them, is to prevent commercialization of the profession, deterioration
of the traditional attorney-client relationship and possible conflicts of interest between
attorney and client. However, although unauthorized practice cases usually arise in
the context of a commercial enterprise furnishing legal services to its customers as an
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these doctrines are concerned developed. Thus, throughout the years there
has been a constant attempt to minimize undignified competition between
lawyers for clients, deterioration of the attorney-client relation, conflicts of
interest between attorney and client, and fraudulent or oppressive litigation.
Such bar practices as advertising or solicitation by lawyers to secure remunera-
tive business and the writing of wills by trust company attorneys for customers
of their employer have been prohibited as encouraging these evils without sub-
stantial criticism. But as prohibitions on activity in the legal sphere have in-
friiged on less commercial activity, the validity of the rules has been increas-
accommodation service [see e.g., Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Association, 167
Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958)], the rule has been applied to activities bearing some re-
semblance to those of the NAACP. In People ex tel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate
Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933), for example, the rule was applied to a non-
profit political-action group organized by Chicago property owners to fight tax laws deemed
unfavorable to owners of real estate. In return for annual dues and a small fee, the group
agreed to contest members' tax bills in the courts. In declaring that the group had engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law, the court dismissed as irrelevant the contention that int-
dividual action, considering the comparatively small amount owing by single taxpayers,
would have been impractical. Before NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S,.2d 55
(1960), there appears to have been no case in which the rule was applied to a charitable
organization rendering free legal services to the public. As a general rule, however, it has
been held immaterial that legal services are rendered free of charge. Grievance Comm. of
State Bar v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Washington Bar Ass'n v.
Washington Ass'n. of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952) ; State ex rel. Hunter
v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 276 N.W. 380 (1937). But see Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v.
Grievance Comm. of State Bar, 142 Tex. 506, 516-17, 179 S.W.2d 946, 952 (1944) ; Opinion
of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 615, 194 N.E. 313, 317-18 (1935). In dealing with the prob-
lem of unauthorized practice, however, courts have been more flexible than may appear
from their dicta. While adhering verbally to the formula that corporations may not "practice
law," courts have often recognized competing interests. Where such interests are compell-
ing, courts often evade the issue by finding that the activity does not constitute the "prac-
tice of law"; less frequently they admit that the activity in question constitutes the practice
of law but refuse to declare it unlawful. Compare Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d
855 (1952), with Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo.
398, 312 P2d 998 (1957). The uneasiness of courts in such situations is illustrated by an
Ohio case which held it unlawful for a title company to sell title opinions, but went on to
suggest that it would be "'practical' as well as 'legal'" for the company to grant its lawyers
"leaves of absence" and for customers themselves to employ these lawyers to render opinions.
Steer v. Land Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 33, 41, 113 N.E.2d 763, 768
(C.P. 1953).
In the context of organizations such as the NAACP, of course, it could not be held that
the services received by sponsored litigants are non-legal. The crucial question would be
whether or not lawyers associated with the organization represent litigants in their capacity
as private attorneys or in their capacity as employees or associates of the organization, The
presence of this question would permit some judicial flexibility. It seems likely that a
sympathetic court would adopt the reasoning of a recent Ohio case which held that an in-
corporated legal aid society which employed attorneys and charged fees in accordance with
litigants' ability to pay was merely an "agency of reference" bringing together attorney and
client and was not "attempting to practice law or in its own interest acting as an intermediary
for such purpose." Azzarello v. Legal Aid Society, 185 N.E.2d 566, 570 (Ohio Ct. App.
1962).
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ingly questioned. Thus, when applied to such practices as the conduct of group
legal clinics by public-spirited lawyers or labor unions in order to provide low
cost legal services for members of the general public or of particular groups,
the doctrines have been vigorously assailed as over-protective of professional
vested interests. Regulations are then viewed as contributing to an unfortunate
and unnecessary public ignorance of legal rights and obligations.Y
Regardless of their merit as they apply to such quasi-commercial practices,
these criticisms forcefully suggest that great caution should be exercised in de-
76. See, e.g., In re Cohn, 10 Ill2d 186, 196, 139 N.E2d 301, 306 (1956) (concurring
opinion) ; see also Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lauyers,
25 U. CHL L. REv. 674 (1958); and Brennan, The Bugaboo "Ambulance Chasing," 6
CAL. S.B.J. 37 (1931). Criticism is especially strong where the rule against unauthorized
practice has been applied to bar labor unions from offering free legal services to their mem-
bers or employers to their employees. See, e.g., DaiNsce, LEGAL ETUics 167 (1957). In this
area, there is evidence of widespread evasion and considerable resistance by the bar. Thus,
a recent survey indicates that it is a common practice for labor union lawyers to perform
personal services for officials and members at union expense. Segal, Labor Union Lawyers:
Professional Services of Lawyers to Organiced Labor, 5 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 343, 361
(1952). Another poll shows that members of the bar are far from unanimous on the ques-
tion of whether such conduct is unethical. McCracken, Report on the Observance by the
Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37 VA. L. REv. 399, 400-01 (1951). Citing this latter
poll, one writer points out:
The significance of this attitude becomes apparent when it is recognized that the
canons of ethics can be fully effective as standards of conduct only if they commend
themselves to the members of the bar as reasonable.
Note, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lay Organizations Providing the Services of
Attonteys, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1334, 1349 (1959). Although the majority of the bar remains
in favor of the rule as applied to labor unions, it is not improbable that this particular ap-
plication will, as in the case of the recent opposition of the American Medical Association
to the growth of group clinics, succumb to stronger forces. See American Medical Ass'n v.
United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), and Comment, The American Medical Association:
Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organicd Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 937, 976-93 (1954).
There is one group of solicitation cases which has also been the subject of special cri-
ticism. The cases deal with a program established by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
in 1928 to assist injured members and to prevent over-zealous railroad claims adjusters from
securing unconscionable settlements. When an accident occurred, the union's legal depart-
ment would send investigators to secure evidence and to refer injured members to selected at-
torneys for prosecution of personal injury and workmen's compensation claims. If litigation
proved necessary, the attorneys would take the case on a pre-arranged contingent fee basis.
The program has been frustrated by a series of decisions holding it unethical as contrary to
the rules against solicitation. In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150
N.E.2d 163 (1958); Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v. Jackson, 235 F2d 390 (10th Cir. 1956)
(dictum); Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.,V.2d 379 (1952) ; Hildebrand v.
State Bar, 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950) ; In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y.
1933). Contra, Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932). Recently the Su-
preme Court agreed to review a decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar (unreported,
Aug. 31, 1962), upholding an injunction prohibiting the Brotherhood's legal activities. 31
U.S.L. WEEK 3255 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1963). For criticism of the cases see Hildebrand v.
State Bar, supra at 521, 225 P.2d at 518 (dissenting opinion by Traynor, J.) ; DNxxEn,
LEGAL ETHics 161-67 (1957).
1963] 1631
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
termining the application of doctrines of solicitation and unauthorized practice
of law to wholly noncommercial activities such as those of the NAACP.17 Cer-
tainly NAACP activities do not tend to commercialize the legal profession or
impair the dignity of courts.78 Because of the absence of pecuniary incentives,
the familiar type of conflict of interest problem, typified by the trust company
attorney drawing a will for his employer's client, does not arise. And while
such organizations do foment litigation (this being in a sense their very raison
d'etre), litigiousness is objectionable and normally regulable only because of
the need to protect private defendants as a class from the vexation and op-
pression of frequent law suits37 Granted the NAACP and other civil rights
litigators are litigious, the fact that their suits are almost always brought
against the state or some other governing enterprise renders inapposite state
objections on these grounds. Indeed, since the state, as an adversary in such
77. The Canons of Legal Ethics, if they are to remain effective, cannot be applied in-
flexibly without regard to the evils they are designed to meet or to competing social values.
As Harlan Stone remarked:
I would only point out that in the new order which has been forced upon us, we cannot
expect the Bar to function as it did in other days and under other conditions.... Our
canons of ethics for the most part are generalizations designed for an earlier era.
However undesirable the practices condemned, they do not profoundly affect the
social order outside our own group. We must not permit our attention to the relatively
inconsequential to divert us from preparing to set appropriate standards for those
who design the legal patterns for business practices of far more consequence to
society than any with which our grievance committees have been preoccupied.
Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HA.v. L. REV. 1, 10 (1934). And see AMRIuCAN
BAR AssocI.ATIoN, OPINIONS OF THE CoImzITTE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs AND GIIEv-
ANCES, Opinion 148 (1935), at 308, 312.
78. Indeed, such activities have been responsible for some of the proudest moments in the
history of the bar. Refusing to apply the solicitation rule in the case of a lawyer who
volunteered his services in defense of a Negro accused of murdering a white family, the
court in In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D.C. Md. 1934), referred to the many instances where
famous men have "solicited" business in this manner-Andrew Hamilton's defense of John
Peter Zenger in 1734, Luther Martin's defense of Aaron Burr, and Clarence Darrow's ap-
pearance for the defense in Scopes v. Tennessee, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927), are
among those mentioned. In re Ades, supra at 475-76.
79. The concept of litigation as an evil developed in times when courts were easily in-
fluenced by the rich and powerful and procedural rules made adjudication largely a contest
of wits. This element is noticeable in the considerations which gave rise to one of the
original barratry-maintenance statutes-the practice of medieval English lords who brought
vexations and groundless suits to blackmail their inferiors and who supported the litigation of
their retainers in order to aggrandize their own realms. Radin, Maintenance by Chainperty,
24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 64 (1935). Understandably, litigation in those times was regarded as
an evil to which honest men would resort only in extreme circumstances. Intermeddling by
a stranger was presumptively immoral.
Today, with changing conceptions of the role of courts in society, the attitude that
litigation is necessarily evil has waned. Increasingly it is recognized that "if in medieval
England, powerful men oppressed their weaker fellow subjects by maintaining suits against
them, in modern society powerful people are more likely to achieve their ends by daring their
victims to maintain suits." Radin, supra at 77-78; see also POUND, THE SPrIRT OF Tu.
CommoN LAw 134 (1921).
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litigation, is in fact defending the dominant interests from minority attack, the
danger of oppression is present only when the state hinders the bringing of
lawsuits. Finally, since the activities of organizational litigators were never
before thought to be illegal, it would seem difficult to argue that exempting
such activities from the prohibitions would open loopholes lessening the effec-
tiveness of the rules in a commercial context.
A finding, however, that the activities of organizational litigators do not
create the dangers at which traditional ethical prescriptions are aimed does
not mean that no dangers are present which might justify a more narrowly
drawn version of the regulation attempted by Virginia. Despite the fact that
financial incentives to service of conflicting interests are absent, the danger that
ideological commitments may lead an organization to disregard the interests of
its litigants cannot be overlooked. Where an organization encourages access to
courts primarily for political ends, its policy objectives may influence, in a
manner contrary to the interests of those whose litigation it supports, the de-
cisions of the attorneys it provides or recommends of whether and when to sue
or take an appeal. Narrow grounds of decision may be forfeited in order to
preserve an opportunity to litigate more important issues. While it is im-
probable, considering the charitable nature of the services involved,8 0 that em-
ployment or compensation by the organization would itself tempt attorneys to
act contrary to their individual beliefs and standards, "control" as such by the
organization is unimportant. The civil rights attorney will likely share the
goals of his organization even before he joins forces with it. And this may be
seen to present the conflict problem in a new guise: the attorney may have an
active interest conflicting with that of the client; the organization, as a referral
mechanism, enhances the chances that litigants will find their way to cause-
oriented attorneys.81 Thus, the likelihood that conflicts of interest will occur is
80. Most organizations rely primarily on volunteer legal services. Attorneys cooperat-
ing with the American Civil Liberties Union, for example, are reimbursed for out-of-pocket
expenses in sponsored litigation but otherwise serve without fee. AmwuRcmr Cin . Lmmrs
UNIoN, 42ND ANNUAL REPORT 86 (1962). While the NAACP continues to enjoy the
services of eminent volunteers, the increasing volume of litigation in which it participates,
particularly in the South, has necessitated the employment of attorneys on a regular basis.
Thus, members of the legal staff of the Virginia Conference of NAACP Branches receive
$60 per diem plus out-of-pocket expenses for their services in connection with sponsored
litigation. See note 39 supra. While this per diem payment is sizeable, it is apparently less
than the attorneys normally receive. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420-21, 444 (1963).
And in any case it would seem unlikely, considering the racial situation in the South, that at-
torneys are attracted to civil rights work by expectation of monetary rewNard. For an ac-
count of the difficulties encountered by William L. Higgs-a white attorney who, until
recently, represented Negroes in civil rights cases in Mlississippi-see Carter, A Lawtyer
Leaves Mississippi, The Reporter, Vol. 28, No. 10, May 9, 1963, p. 33. It is probable, there-
fore, that any attempt by the Association to force the hands of its attorneys would result in
their leaving the organization.
81. As a practical manner, litigants may be unable to find non-cause-oriented attorneys.
Because of the highly-charged racial situation, the Association often provides representa-
tion which would otherwise be unavailable. And in this context "cause-orientation" may be
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increased-and it is this danger which may be reduced by a statute barring
organizational referral.
In the particular case of the NAACP, however, the danger of prejudice to
litigants arising from such conflicts of interest seems largely hypothetical. The
Association's objectives are so well-known that many prospective applicants
for assistance will probably foresee the extent to which NAACP interests and
those of its attorneys conflict with their own. Moreover, the Association is like-
ly to seek litigants with whom it has a complete community of interests. Cases
involving relevant issues are not so rare nor test suits so difficult to arrange
as to force the Association to resort to the "pirating" of cases in order to
pursue its goals; often, assisted litigants are officials of the Association or other
persons who themselves have a desire for the adjudiciation of important con-
stitutional issues. The unlikelihood of prejudice to litigants is especially evident
in the school segregation suits which make up the greater part of Association-
sponsored litigation in Virginia. These suits are almost without exception tried
as class actions and generally involve large numbers of plaintiffs.8" Although
the interests of the Association may not coincide with those of each plaintiff,
they are likely to be representative of the class as a whole. Most indicative of
the hypothetical nature of the danger of prejudice to litigants in the case of the
NAACP is the fact that Virginia, in the Button case, was unable to show a
single case of actual prejudice or produce a single litigant dissatisfied with
Association service.83
Despite the fact that the danger of prejudice arising from conflicting in-
terests is slight in the case of the NAACP, it cannot be dismissed as non-
existent. And regardless of the conclusion one might draw concerning the
scruples of the NAACP, the danger remains that other organizations might
resort to less wholesome techniques. 84 The presence of this danger, when con-
sidered in the context of Virginia's admittedly high interest in protecting its
litigants from prejudice, strongly supports, although it may not compel, justice
Harlan's position that the incidental impairment of first amendment rights
which would be wrought by regulation of organizational litigators on this ac-
count is justifiable.
a virtue rather than a vice. Consider, for example, the apparent reluctance of southern white
lawyers to raise the defense of systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries, See Note,
Negro Defendants and Southern Lawyers: Review in Federal Habeas Corpus of S.steinatic
Exchusion of Negroes from Juries, 72 YALE L.J. 559, 561-65 (1963).
82. See note 43 supra.
83. This inability seems to have been largely owing to the Association's prior recogitl-
tion of the problem and conscious effort to avoid prejudice to litigants. At one of the con-
ferences preceding the restrictive covenant cases, for example, the problem of protecting
individual homeowners from injury which might result if lawyers rejected narrow in favor
of broad grounds in order to develop a test case, was discussed frankly and at length. Vost,
CAucAsLANs ONLY 59-60 (1959).
84. The International Labor Defense, for example, has been said to have engaged in
a number of questionable practices. See In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467, 479-80 (D.C. Md. 1934);
RFYNOLDS, CouRTRooa: THE STORY OF SA,xuEL S. LBowrTz 288-314 (1950).
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A SUGGESTED APPROACH : IMPAIRMENT OF ACCESS TO JUDICAL REDRESS
Before adopting a balancing approach, a second perspective on the constitu-
tional propriety of the Virginia legislation may be edifying. It may appear that
the statute's almost certain effects give rise to constitutional problems dis-
tinguishable from those ordinarily associated with legislation passed in exercise
of the state's parens patriae function. Thus, though the statute restricts li-
tigiousness, it is not private defendants who are protected from suit, but the
state. And though there may be a largely hypothetical conflict of interest through
the organization's asserting broad policy arguments and sacrificing narrow
grounds for decision, the state, or its dominant group, has provided substantial
protection for itself from the establishment of far-reaching precedent. It is in
the execution of what is hypothetically identified as the state's regulatory interest
in protecting, not consumers directly, but the functions of its courts, however,
that the strongest evidence of ambivalent statutory effect is demonstrated.
Thus, among the hypothetical interests which might be martialed to sup-
port the statute against constitutional attack on first amendment grounds are
state interests in the proper functioning of courts. The state legislature may be
impelled to action by potential interference with the administration of justice-
overcrowding of dockets through a proliferation of actions sponsored by per-
sons with only an ideological interest; presentation of cases to the courts, with
issues too broadly framed for wise decision, by persons without completely ad-
versary interests; and unwarranted judicial intervention in the political pro-
cess arising from resort to the judiciary for reasons of expediency rather than
necessity. Therefore, it may wish to insure, through legislation, an emphasis
upon the passive nature of courts, and the removal of courts from the main-
stream of the political process.
The passive aspect of courts has been consistently recognized. As a general
rule, decision is based on the narrowest possible ground to avoid premature
and possibly unfortunate policy decisions.85 It is normally the adversary sys-
tem which is relied on to chum up all the relevant issues, thus preserving as
wide a range of alternative grounds for decision as possible.80 Should an
organization attempt to force a decision on too broad grounds by suppressing
possibly successful lines of argument in the interest of creating precedent, it
would be doing a disservice to the court. Here, the same ideological conflict of
interest which in other contexts has been seen as endangering litigants may
also be viewed as involving possible detriment to the efficient administration of
justice.
8 7
85. See, e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,45-46,48 (1953) ; Kovacs v. Brewer,
356 U.S. 604, 607-08 (1958) ; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341,
345-48 (1936) (concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis).
86. See BicKEL, THE LEAsT DANGFROUS BRANCH 171-72 (1962).
87. Courts have developed techniques of non-decision, rooted in doctrines of standing
and ripeness, to resist such imposition of questions too broadly framed for wise decision. See
generally id. at 111-98. Despite the availability of these means of judicial self-defense, how-
ever, practices which tend to necessitate their use may be viewed as dangerous.
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It is not only by narrowing the grounds available for decision that the ac-
tivities of organizations such as the NAACP may encourage unwarranted
judicial intervention in the political process. Courts, as passive organs, are to
decide constitutional questions only as an incident to the decision of cases
brought by persons who have themselves suffered some special, direct injury.8 8
But the state may fear that the zeal of litigating organizations will upset the
carefully delimited set of circumstances in which cases may be brought before
a court for decision. Limitation on court action, rooted in the Constitution, is
well-grounded in important policy considerations.89 Where no person directly
affected by a particular statute or governmental action feels sufficiently ag-
grieved to seek judicial relief, judicial intervention has seemed unjustifiable.
As Professor Frankfurter wrote with regard to the Supreme Court:
The Court is not the forum for a chivalrous or disinterested defense of the
Constitution. Its business is with self-regarding, immediate, secular
claims.90
On an analogy to the federal requirement of standing, the state legislature
might wish to enforce these policies by preventing situations in which organiza-
tions, rather than individuals, were the source of litigation activity. The legisla-
ture might condemn solicitation broadly since it would be difficult to dis-
tinguish organization activity educating citizens in their rights from activity
imposing citizens' names upon suits in which they were basically uninter-
ested.91 The suitor's unaided initiative in requesting assistance would, in these
88. The federal judicial power extends only to the decision of cases or controversies.
U.S. CoNsT., art. III, § 2. It is well settled that this limitation renders the federal courts
powerless to render advisory opinions or to decide abstract questions at the instance of per-
sons having only an ideological interest. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
(1923).
89. Limitation on court action is wise not only for reasons of proper judicial administra-
tion-the prevention of unwise policy decisions-but also as a matter of democratic theory.
The counter-majoritarian nature of the judiciary has been noted. See, e.g., BxciczL, note 86
supra at 16-23; MASON & BEAxEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SocIETY 318-20 (1959).
Judicial intervention in the political process is the deviant rather than the norm, The
existence of an aggrieved who has suffered some special injury would seem the basis of any
acceptable justification for judicial action. As Professor Bickel has noted:
For the Court to entertain such a suit as Frothingham [See Massachusetts v. Mellon,
note 88 supra] and to adjudicate the constitutional issue tendered would, in my judg-
ment, materially alter the function of judicial review and seriously undermine any ac-
ceptable justification for it.
Bic=EI, supra at 122.
90. Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms,
1935 and 1936,51 HARv. L. REv. 577, 623 (1938).
91. The NAACP frequently has been accused of obtaining authorizations to sue by
fraud or payment of bribes. See Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP
Laws, 12 W. PoL. Q. 371, 375 (1959). While these accusations appear to be untrue, they sug-
gest a danger which may inhere in the activities of all litigating groups. Were such groups to
"roam the streets and barrooms" seeking out persons who, though themselves uninterested,
were willing to have suits instituted in their names, one seeming function of federal standing
rules-the prevention of unwarranted litigation and judicial intervention in the political pro-
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circumstances, permit an inference of minimal personal concern. And on an
analogy to the federal court policy of avoiding, where possible, constitutional
decision, the state might wish to make clear the impropriety of court action in
the political arena.
By selecting and emphasizing one aspect of the functional role of courts, how-
ever, the legislature may be ignoring-or intentionally infringing upon--other
roles which courts have consistently asserted their duty to play in the mechanism
of constitutional government. Through the settling of disputes, courts are able to
define statutory or constitutional rules which establish the relationship of citi-
zens to the state. Under the system of constitutional government, courts, espe-
cially federal courts, have asserted their role as a check against majorities who
are, at particular times, in control of the legislative and executive branches of
government.9 2 They thus provide essential protections for minorities institu-
tionally unable to utilize other routes of social change. In this role, courts not
only seek to preserve the regular operation of the democratic processes but also
act to protect individuals from arbitrary or discriminatory governmental ac-
tion. Additionally, courts must perform some function as important policy-
making institutions. This is especially true in areas, such as civil rights, in
which they have special competence. 3 Oversimplified concepts such as the
view that courts merely apply "law" comport neither with reality nor theory.0
In interpreting and applying constitutions and legislative enactments, courts
have asserted that they do and should play a significant role in defining the
rules which shall govern society.
These latter functions are not important for themselves, but for the protec-
tion which they afford to minorities otherwise unable to secure social con-
trols. Prevention of civil rights litigation, since in its trail it brings down per-
formance and, hence, exercise of these functions, deprives minorities of their
principal source of protection under the Constitution. Until effectively chal-
lenged in the courts, "unconstitutional" legislation remains fully operative and
arbitrary or discriminatory governmental practices desired by majorities go
unchecked. As a result, while statutes such as the Virginia statute may be
viewed optimally as performing legitimate administrative and definitional func-
tions, it is clear that their effects may go directly toward upsetting the in-
stitutionalized system of minority safeguards from majority rule, if they sub-
stantially reduce the citizens' ability to obtain protection through access to the
courts.
cess-would be thwarted. Although this particular objection would not apply where the
organization advised persons of their rights, induced in them a desire to sue, and thus secured
litigants Having a real personal interest, it would be difficult, in practice, to differentiate the
two situations.
92. See AL£soN & BzAN'Y, THE SurPmlE COURT IN A FREE Socxrsn 318-20 (1959).
93. Cf. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility
in a Federal System, 67 YA. LJ. 1327 (1958).
94. See CAHiLL, JUDIcIAL LacisLATioN 8-9 (1952); CARnozo, THE N.TURE OF TRE
JUDIcIAL PRocEss (1931).
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In the field of civil rights, adjudication of individual claims may require the
financial and moral encouragement of public-spirited organizations. Certainly,
the Supreme Court has often emphasized a passive aspect through strident
articulation of a reluctance to decide constitutional issues not properly pre-
sented.95 But, aware of the special problems of civil rights, the Court has not
only tolerated but welcomed the participation of civil rights litigators such as
the NAACP. During the past three decades these organizations have been
responsible for the great bulk of important litigation in the field of civil
rights.96 Given the cost of court action,97 the diffuse operation of state in-
vasions of freedom, and the unfortunate unwillingness of the legal profession
to provide adequate representation for members of unpopular minorities,08 in-
dividual action seeking to enforce civil rights may be rendered impossible or
improbable by the forces of impersonal "market conditions." In these circum-
stances, the organizational litigator may be the only agency capable of pro-
viding the oppressed with an opportunity to assert their rights in court.
The litigating organization has the advantage of a continuing existence.
Long-range planning and activity in pursuit of its stated policy goals is
usually thus assured. The organization is a convenient marshaling point for
the resources of all persons, no matter what degree their interest, and a con-
venient dissemination point for educational campaigns directed to the public at
large. This ability to interact with a relatively broad segment of the community
95. See note 85 supra.
96. See Appendix, infra.
97. Litigation is a costly, if effective, form of political action. Where the state is a party
or where important issues are at stake, civil rights cases are likely to be bitterly fought. And
where local courts are unsympathetic, even assertions of rights which are well-establishcd
may involve appeals to higher tribunals and, thus, large expenditures. The time and cost of
prosecuting a single case through to an appeal to the Supreme Court have been estimated at
four years and $10,000. See BLAISDELL, AMzRIcAN DEMOCRACY UNDER PREssu=a 263
(1957) ; and Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 Annals 20 (1958).
In the historic case of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the N.A.A.C.P.
Legal Defense and Educational Fund spent more than $200,000. NAACP v. Patty, 159 F.
Supp. 503, 510 (E.D. Va. 1958). More often than not the expenditure of time and money will
prove fruitless: the Supreme Court will deny certiorari, decide on a narrow ground, or
render an adverse decision. The legal struggle of the NAACP has been described as
a slow, whittling process wherein courts have usually decided cases on the narrowest
possible grounds, thereby enabling individuals and governments to evade the effect
of the decision. Renewed work and further expenditure is then necessary to invalidate
the discriminatory practice, under each newer and clever disguise, until it is rec-
ognized in all its forms as illegal.
Comment, Private Attorneys-Gcneral: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58
YALE L.J. 574, 585 (1949). Quite apparently, litigation by individuals on such a scale is
unlikely.
98. See Ernst and Schwartz, The Right to Counsel and the Unpopular Cause, 20 U.
PrrT. L. REv. 727 (1959); and RosTow, THE SOVEREIGr PREROGATIVE: Tup SurmtM
COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW 41 (1962). See also Carter, A Lawyer Leaves Mississippi,
The Reporter, Vol. 28, No. 10, May 9, 1963, pp. 33, 34.
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reflects an advantage in gathering the vast resources of money, legal talent,"
and suitable case material 0 needed for successful prosecution of policy con-
cerns. Because of these advantages, as contrasted with the inability of indi-
viduals to act in their own behalf, organizations have become the established
agencies for challenging state deprivations of federal rights. Legislative curtail-
ment of their activities would therefore have the effect of substantially hinder-
ing, and in some cases preventing, litigants from securing protection for their
fundamental constitutional rights.
1 1
In sum, all the apparent dangers-litigiousness, conflict of interests, adminis-
tration of the courts-which might lead to legitimate legislative concern with
activities of groups such as the NAACP arise necessarily from the litigation ac-
tivities in which they engage-the sponsoring and prosecution of constitutional
claims against the state. Legislative regulation, the statement by the state that
the dangers will not be tolerated, thus appears to be a statement to the effect that
such claims will not be heard, the erection of a barrier of sovereign immunity to
constitutional litigation which may in practical effect be nearly complete. This
result may imply improper interference with the processes even of the state
99. Felix Frankfurter, Morris L. Ernst, Arthur Garfield Hays, Francis Biddle, Frank
Murphy, and Clarence Darrow are among the distinguished lawyers who have assisted the
NAACP. Vose, NAACP Strategy in the Covenant Cases, 6 NV. Rus. L. Rzv. 101, 103
(1955).
100. Sociological and economic data may be extremely important in the prosecution of
civil rights suits. Statistics developed to show the relation between housing segregation and
the development of Negro slums, for example, contributed greatly to the NAACP's success
in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See VosE, CAucAsLxs ONLY 65-68 (1959). And
the now famous footnote eleven of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.11
(1954), demonstrates that such data may have a decisive influence. The ready access to uni-
versity personnel enjoyed by such groups as the NAACP and the American Civil Liberties
Union gives them a significant advantage over the private litigant.
101. Absent the litigating activity of organizations such as the NAACP, the per-
formance by courts of their protective and policy-making functions in the area of civil rights
would be greatly hindered. This is no less obvious with respect to the policy-making func-
tion than it is with respect to the protective function. For courts to make policy they need not
only cases, but large numbers of cases from which to choose their opportunities. This factor
is especially noticeable in constitutional litigation at the United States Supreme Court
level, where the certiorari practice, among others, is designed to allow the Court to select
cases whose facts and prior histories present the best context in, which to formulate policy.
In the area of civil rights, courts cannot depend upon individual initiative to supply the
requisite volume of litigation. Thus, the energetic, well-financed and insistent litigating
activity of organizations such as the NAACP may well be essential if courts are to perform
effectively in this area. As Blaisdell has noted:
In policy-making by the judiciary. . . it is the readiness of self-conscious groups,
under competent leadership and with adequate resources, to appeal to the judicial
process which provides the opportunity for the courts to make policy... Can fair
rates be fixed and enforced and discriminatory practices prevented on the railroads?
The answer turned on the readiness of aggrieved farmers ... as users of transporta-
tion to create an opportunity for the courts to make public policy by ruling on the
issues.
BLi-SDE-., AmmcAN DE-vocRAcy UNDER PREssuRE 265 (1957).
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courts. As a coordinate branch of constitutional government, they might proper-
ly hold the legislation unconstitutional as applied to bar suits in state courts,
arguing that only they and the decision-makers at the level of constitutional
amendment ought to have such control over their functional performance.102
Ever since Marbury v. Madison,'0 3 courts have asserted their authority to de-
cide constitutional cases; legislation which seemingly infringed upon the exer-
cise of this authority might be found objectionable. For federal courts, however,
and for the enforcement of federal rights, the practical effect of the Virginia
statute, in substantially reducing the opportunity for access, seems a result so
objectionable as to make any first amendment balancing inquiry irrelevant.
Access to the federal courts has been said to be a privilege and immunity of na-
tional citizenship within that range of federal rights beyond the power of a state
to impair.10 4 Thus, the question of access to federal courts is one entirely tinder
the control of the federal courts and legislature. Although state rules may have
been adopted in some circumstances, for reasons of convenience, they are
adopted only because of their congruity with, and not despite interference with,
federal policy. Since Marbury v. Madison,10 there has even been substantial
question as to the right of Congress to control access, at least at the Supreme
Court level;106 it is certainly clear that states would be found without power
to foreclose parties from seeking enforcement of federal rights in federal courts
by any restriction that those courts would not impose. The citizen's relation-
ship to the Constitution and its enforcement is beyond their regulatory reach.
This conclusion, arising from relational rights inherent in the constitutional
structure of federalism, draws strength from, but does not depend upon the
first amendment.10 7 Given the right of the citizen to enforce his federal rights
in state courts, it might also extend to state regulation of state courts, insofar
as federal rights are involved in litigation-as they invariably will be in civil
rights cases.' 08 Thus any state regulation which has the effect of substantially
denying access to the courts for the enforcement of federal rights, if enforce-
ment is sought in a manner complying with federal policies respecting stand-
ing, ripeness, or other similar requirements, is unconstitutional as applied. A
102. That such an argument might prevail in the context of the federal constitutional
structure is demonstrated by Professor Hart in HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDrAL CouaRs
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 312-13, 317-19 (1953).
103. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
104. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873) ; Terral v.
Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922) ; and United States v. Lancaster, 44 F.
885 (W.D. Ga. 1896) ; see also Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867).
105. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
106. It is widely assumed that Congress could insulate its legislation from constitutional
attack (i.e., totally block access to the courts) through exercise of its powers to create in-
ferior federal courts and to regulate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Professor Hart
argues convincingly that the assumption is fallacious. See HART & WECHSLER, note 102
supra, at 312-40.
107. Cf. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
108. Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) ; General Oil Co. v. Cran, 209 U.S. 211
(1908).
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conclusion that a state may not prospectively deny federal constitutional or
statutory rights by preventing or unreasonably impeding their enforcement
would seem inherent in the concept of due process and constitutional govern-
ment.
Neither Chapter 33 nor regulations based on the "lay intermediary" char-
acter or organizational litigators, of course, would have the effect of totally
blocking access to the federal courts or entirely foreclosing the assertion of
federal rights. While it is here argued that such regulations would necessarily
curtail the activities of litigating organizations substantially,10 9 they would not,
in themselves, preclude individual action. And it cannot be asserted that legisla-
tion erecting but a partial bar is necessarily unconstitutional.1 10 Relevant in
this connection would be the extent of the bar, its compatibility with federal
policy, and, to some slight degree, the nature and importance of the state in-
terests protected. These questions, contrary to the apparent implication of
Justice Harlan's dissent, would be matters for independent consideration by
the Court.'" His argument that "the state policy is not unrelated to the federal
rules of standing""-2 and thus that "it cannot be argued that the underlying
state policy is inevitably inconsistent with federal interests" 3 is unpersuasive.
In view of the Court's traditional insistence upon making its own determina-
tions in matters of standing,114 deference to state legislative judgment here
seems entirely out of place. Furthermore, consideration should not be con-
fined exclusively to federal standing policies, but should include the entire
range of federal policies. When such consideration is given, any state measure
which substantially curtails the activities of organizational litigators would
seem clearly inconsistent with federal interests.
If, as is here asserted, Chapter 33 would have substantially curtailed the
litigating ability of the NAACP, it would seem that the majority in Button
might better have anchored its decision in the effect the legislation would have
on access to courts. The first amendment balance is at best imprecise, at least
uncertain and indeed may tilt in the state's favor. If it were possible for a state
to draft legislation which would protect its citizens and courts from the dan-
gers organizational litigators present and yet not substantially impair their liti-
109. See note 59 supra.
110. For example, Canon 42 (note 27 rupra), by preventing attorneys from paying
court costs, obstructs access to both the federal and state courts. It is not here argued, how-
ever, that the Canon is unconstitutional for this reason.
111. In dealing with the problem of access, Justice Harlan appears to have based his
decision sustaining Chapter 33 on two arguments. The first, that the statute would not have
substantially impaired the NAACP's function of vindicating constitutional rights (371
U.S. at 465), is disputed above. See note 60 supra. The second, that the state policy which
may have motivated the legislation seems analogous to the federal policy with regard to
standing, is ambiguous. The implication, however, is that Harlan considered constitutionally
unobjectionable any obstruction of access motivated by a state policy analogous to a federal
policy. This would seem not to be the proper test.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Professor Freund has even suggested that the Supreme Court's determination of
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gating effectiveness, constitutional objection to it would seem irresponsible; it
is not clear, however, that such legislation would escape the sweep of Justice
Brennan's opinion. A decision based upon the statute's effect upon the as-
sertion of federally guaranteed rights, however, would sharply define the
boundaries of permissible state regulation and would involve a principled state-
ment objectionable only to those who repudiate the notion of a federal sys-
tem. Such an approach, rationalizing all of the Court's recent pronouncements
respecting the NAACP,115 would have given open recognition to the larger is-
sues presented by the Virginia legislation-that states were seeking to nullify
federal law, in this case by striking at those who, as "private attorneys-gen-
eral," are presently its most effective enforcers.
APPENDIX
To determine the extent of group participation in civil rights litigation at the United
States Supreme Court level, the Yale Law Journal compiled a list of 318 post-1933 Su-
preme Court civil rights cases and requested 23 organizations to check those in which they
had provided financial or legal assistance, filed amicus briefs, or given strategic advice. The
case list included, in addition to others deemed important by the editors, every case printed
in whole or in substantial part in either Volume II (on civil rights) of FREUND, SUTrIER-
LAND, HOWE & BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Second Ed. 1961) or EmERSON & HADnl
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, VOLS. I & II (Second Ed, 1958). The
results of this survey, tabulated from the replies of 13 of the organizations, are shown on the
tables below.
It should be remarked that these tables do not reflect the full extent of group participa-
tion in Supreme Court civil rights litigation. Since the figures show the activities of but 13
groups (five other groups, the AFL-CIO, the American Friends Service Committee, the
National Lawyers Guild, the Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, and the Workers Defense League, failed to submit data; five more, the
American Council for Nationalities Service, the American Liberty League [now defunct],
the Americans for Democratic Action, the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors,
and the National Urban League, answered that they had participated in none of the cases
listed), an allowance should be made for the activities of the many groups and ad hoc com-
mittees not included. Also, the list of cases forming the basis of the survey included many of
a type only remotely affecting the interests of definable minority groups. It is believed that
the percentage participation in certain areas of civil rights (free speech, for example) is
somewhat greater than that in the field as a whole. When these factors are taken into ac-
count, the percentage figure of 88 for cases printed in both FREUND ET AL., supra, and EMER.-
SON & HADER, supra, (inclusion in both of these text books would seem to indicate that a
case is of special importance) and the percentage figure of 54 overall is impressive.
Information forming the basis of the tables and this discussion was drawn from let-
ters from Osmond Fraenkel, General Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, March
27, 1963; Robert Carter, General Counsel of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, March 15, 1963; Leo Pfeffer, Director of the Commission on Law and
Social Action of the American Jewish Congress, March 13, 1963; Blanch Freedman, At-
torney for the American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born, March 13, 1963;
Norman C. Amaker of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, March 13,
1963; Leonard Boudin, General Counsel, Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, March 15,
1963; Hayden C. Covington of the Jehovah's Witnesses, March 11, 1963; Oakley C. John-
standing should control the jurisdiction of state courts in federal question suits. Freund,
Forward: The Year of the Steel Case, 66 HARV. L. Rlv. 89, 95 (1952).
115. See note 20 supra.
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to 12 5 42% 12 100%
Cases Printed in 1963
Both Freund Et Al.
and Emerson & Haber 1933to 33 17 52% 29 88%
1963
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Cases Printed to 43 12 28% 23 53%
in Freund Et Al. 1963
But Not in 1933
Emerson & Haber to 100 26 26% 44 44%
1963
1953
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TABLE 2
PARTICIPATION nY EACH OF THIRTEEN GROUPS
IN SELECTED GROUP OF 318






















Liberties Union 31 81 5 13 0 120
NAACP 23 5 0 2 0 30
American Jewish Congress 4 22 0 11 8 29
American Committee for





Liberties Committee 1 4 0 17
Jehovah's Witnesses 17 0 0 0 0 17
Civil Rights Congress 7 0 0 6 0 13
(now defunct)
American Jewish Committee 0 9 0 4 2 11
Japanese American 6 6 0 0 7
Citizens League
International Labor
Defense (now defunct) 5 1 1 1 0 6
American Book
Publishers Council 1 2 0 0 0 3
Association on American
Indian Affairs 0 1 0 0 0 1
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son, Treasurer, Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties, March 19, 1963 (reporting
on the activities of the Civil Rights Congress and the International Labor Defense);
Theodore Leskes of the American Jewish Committee, March 11, 1963; Mike Masaolm,
Washington Representative of the Japanese American Citizens League, March 12, 1963;
Horace S. Manges, General Counsel, American Book Publishers Council, March 19, 1963;
Arthur Lazarus, Jr., General Counsel, Association on American Indian Affairs, Inc.,
March 14, 1963; Edith Lowenstein, Editor, Interpreter Releases, American Council for
Nationalities Service, March 15, 1963; Earl F. Reed (formerly the head of the National
Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty League), March 11, 1963; David Cohen,
Legislative Representative, Americans for Democratic Action, March 27, 1963; Arlo Tatum,
Executive Secretary, Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, March 19, 1963, and
Alexander J. Allen, Associate Executive Director of the National Urban League, June 24,
1963, all to the Yale Law Journal and on file in Yale Law Library.
